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@molecule/api-oauth-twitter

Provider bond · auth · API (Node) · v1.1.0 · Apache-2.0

Twitter OAuth provider for molecule.dev.

npm install @molecule/api-oauth-twitter

npm · Source on GitHub · Implements @molecule/api-oauth

How it works

@molecule/api-oauth-twitter is a provider bond on the API (Node) side: it implements the auth core interface (@molecule/api-oauth) with a concrete vendor or library behind it.

Your code calls the core; you wire this provider once at startup. Swapping vendors later is one line in that wiring, not a rewrite.

Works with: @molecule/api-bond, @molecule/api-http, @molecule/api-oauth, @molecule/api-secrets

Secrets: OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_ID, OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_SECRET

Reference

Auto-generated, AI-first package reference for the molecule.dev ecosystem. It is written to be read by coding agents as much as by people, and is generated from this package's source — edit src/index.ts JSDoc, not this file.

Twitter OAuth provider for molecule.dev.

Setup

  1. Log into Twitter (or sign up).

  2. Open the Twitter Developer Portal.

  3. Create a new project/app and follow Twitter's steps. You may need to verify your account with a phone number.

  4. Fill out your app's information and you should eventually arrive at a screen with an ID, secret, and bearer token. These are not the OAuth client ID and secret, but you should still store them somewhere safe.

  5. Upload your app's logo and description if necessary.

    5.1. Return to Twitter's Developer Portal Dashboard.

    5.2. Open your app under "Projects & Apps".

    5.3. Click the "Edit" button.

    5.4. Upload an image.

    5.5. Update your app's description.

    5.6. Click the "Save" button.

  6. Under "User authentication settings", click the "Set up" button to begin enabling OAuth.

  7. Enable "OAuth 2.0".

  8. Choose "Web App" for "Type of App".

  9. Under "Callback URI / Redirect URL", add entries for BOTH your app origin and each page your app starts OAuth from (X matches these exactly, and the API sends redirect_uri = APP_ORIGIN + the initiating page's path):

    • For development: http://localhost:3000 and http://localhost:3000/login

    • For production: your app's origin (typically your API's APP_ORIGIN environment variable) and the same origin + /login (plus any other OAuth-initiating page paths).

  10. Fill out the remaining information as necessary and click the "Save" button.

  11. You should be taken to a screen containing your OAuth client ID and secret.

    11.1. Set the client ID to your API's OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_ID environment variable.

    11.2. Set the client secret to your API's OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_SECRET environment variable.

  12. Restart your API and/or rebuild your app so that they have the environment variables.

Your users should now be able to log in via Twitter!

Type

provider

Installation

npm install @molecule/api-oauth-twitter @molecule/api-bond @molecule/api-http @molecule/api-oauth @molecule/api-secrets

API

Interfaces

OAuthAuthorizeUrlParams

Parameters for building a provider authorization (initiation) URL — the URL the user's browser is redirected to so the provider can authenticate them and send back an authorization code.

interface OAuthAuthorizeUrlParams {
  /**
   * Absolute URI the provider should redirect the user back to after
   * authorization (the app origin, optionally with a path). When omitted,
   * the builder leaves `redirect_uri` off the URL so the provider falls
   * back to its registered callback URL.
   */
  redirectUri?: string
  /**
   * The CSRF `state` parameter bound to the initiating session (stored in
   * an httpOnly cookie by the initiation endpoint and validated by the
   * login handler on callback).
   */
  state: string
  /**
   * PKCE code challenge derived (S256) from the per-session code verifier.
   * Omit only for providers that do not support PKCE.
   */
  codeChallenge?: string
  /**
   * PKCE challenge method. Always prefer `'S256'`; `'plain'` exists only
   * for providers that cannot hash.
   */
  codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
}

OAuthUserProps

The properties returned when verifying an OAuth code.

interface OAuthUserProps {
  /**
   * An alphanumeric username derived from the OAuth provider.
   *
   * Format: `{provider_username}@{provider_name}`
   */
  username: string
  /**
   * The user's display name from the OAuth provider.
   */
  name?: string
  /**
   * The user's short biography / description from the OAuth provider
   * (e.g. GitHub's `bio`, GitLab's `bio`, X's `description`). Omitted when
   * the provider exposes no such field.
   */
  bio?: string
  /**
   * URL of the user's profile image from the OAuth provider (e.g. Google's
   * `picture`, GitHub/GitLab's `avatar_url`, X's `profile_image_url`).
   * Omitted when the provider exposes none (Apple never does; Microsoft
   * Graph only serves photos as a binary endpoint behind an extra scope).
   */
  avatar?: string
  /**
   * The user's email address from the OAuth provider.
   */
  email?: string
  /**
   * Whether the OAuth provider has affirmatively verified that the user
   * controls this `email` mailbox.
   *
   * `true` MUST mean the provider proved mailbox ownership (e.g. Google's
   * `email_verified`, Apple's `email_verified` ID-token claim). When the
   * provider exposes no trustworthy verification signal in the profile data
   * the verifier fetched, this MUST be `false`/`undefined` (never optimistically
   * `true`) — consumers treat only an explicit `true` as verified.
   *
   * Consumers (e.g. the user resource's `logInOAuth` handler) use this to
   * decide whether a provider-supplied email may be trusted over an existing,
   * unverified local account — preventing an unverified squatter from blocking
   * the verified mailbox owner.
   */
  emailVerified?: boolean
  /**
   * The OAuth server identifier (e.g., 'github', 'google', 'twitter').
   */
  oauthServer: string
  /**
   * Unique identifier for the user from the OAuth provider.
   */
  oauthId: string
  /**
   * Raw user data from the OAuth provider.
   */
  oauthData: Record<string, unknown>
}

Types

OAuthAuthorizeUrlBuilder

Builds the provider's authorization URL for OAuth initiation (GET /users/oauth/:provider → 302 to this URL). Implementations embed their own client id, scopes, and authorize endpoint so no consumer ever hardcodes provider knowledge.

type OAuthAuthorizeUrlBuilder = (params: OAuthAuthorizeUrlParams) => string | null

OAuthVerifier

Exchanges an OAuth authorization code for user profile information.

Implementations call the provider's token and user-info endpoints, then return normalized OAuthUserProps for account creation or login.

Returning null means the provider AFFIRMATIVELY rejected the code (e.g. GitHub's bad_verification_code, an expired/forged code) — the consumer (logInOAuth) surfaces that as a clean 403 "verification failed". A thrown error means an infrastructure failure (network, provider outage) and surfaces as a 500. Implementations MUST NOT throw for a rejected code — that would misreport a client mistake (or an attack) as a server fault.

type OAuthVerifier = (
  code: string,
  codeVerifier?: string,
  redirectUri?: string,
) => Promise<OAuthUserProps | null>

Functions

getAuthorizeUrl(params)

Builds the X (Twitter) authorization URL for OAuth initiation (GET /users/oauth/:provider 302s the browser here). Embeds this bond's client id and scopes (users.read tweet.read — exactly what verify's GET /2/users/me requires) plus the caller's CSRF state and PKCE S256 challenge. The authorize endpoint defaults to https://x.com/i/oauth2/authorize but can be overridden via OAUTH_TWITTER_AUTHORIZE_URL for E2E mocks.

X mandates PKCE on every authorization request — a URL built without a code_challenge will be rejected by X. The shared initiation endpoint always supplies an S256 challenge.

Deliberately does NOT request the offline.access scope: verify never refreshes tokens — the two-hour access token is used exactly once to fetch the user's profile.

function getAuthorizeUrl({
  redirectUri,
  state,
  codeChallenge,
  codeChallengeMethod,
}: OAuthAuthorizeUrlParams): string | null
  • params — State, PKCE challenge, and optional redirect URI.

Returns: The X authorize URL, or null when OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_ID is unset.

verify(code, codeVerifier, redirectUri)

Verifies a Twitter OAuth code and responds with OAuth-related user props.

The token and user-info URLs default to api.twitter.com, but can be overridden via OAUTH_TWITTER_TOKEN_URL and OAUTH_TWITTER_USER_URL (pairing with OAUTH_TWITTER_AUTHORIZE_URL for E2E mock OAuth servers, consistent with the github/gitlab/google bonds).

function verify(
  code: string,
  codeVerifier?: string,
  redirectUri?: string,
): Promise<{
  username: string
  name: string | undefined
  bio: string | undefined
  avatar: string | undefined
  email: string | undefined
  emailVerified: false
  oauthServer: 'twitter'
  oauthId: string
  oauthData: Record<string, unknown>
} | null>
  • code — The authorization code from the OAuth callback.
  • codeVerifier — The PKCE code verifier (if PKCE was used).
  • redirectUri — The redirect URI used in the authorization request.

Returns: An OAuthUserInfo with the user's Twitter username, email, and OAuth ID — or null when X affirmatively rejected the code (expired/reused/forged), which the consumer surfaces as a 403.

Constants

oauthTwitterSecretDefinitions

Secret definitions required by the X (Twitter) OAuth bond.

const oauthTwitterSecretDefinitions: SecretDefinition[]

serverName

The OAuth server identifier for Twitter.

const serverName: 'twitter'

Core Interface

Implements @molecule/api-oauth interface.

Bond Wiring

Setup function to register this provider with the bond system:

import { bond } from '@molecule/api-bond'
import { serverName, verify, getAuthorizeUrl } from '@molecule/api-oauth-twitter'

export function setupOauthTwitter(): void {
  bond('oauth', serverName, { serverName, verify, getAuthorizeUrl })
}

Injection Notes

Requirements

Peer dependencies:

  • @molecule/api-bond ^1.0.1
  • @molecule/api-http ^1.0.1
  • @molecule/api-oauth ^1.0.1
  • @molecule/api-secrets ^1.0.1

Environment Variables

  • OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_ID (required) — X (Twitter) OAuth client ID
  • OAUTH_TWITTER_CLIENT_SECRET (required) — X (Twitter) OAuth client secret

Runtime Dependencies

  • @molecule/api-bond
  • @molecule/api-http
  • @molecule/api-oauth
  • @molecule/api-secrets

The token exchange (verify's call to X's token endpoint) is application/x-www-form-urlencoded, per RFC 6749 §4.1.3 and X's own docs — matching every other molecule.dev OAuth bond (google, gitlab, github, apple, microsoft).

E2E Tests

Integration checklist — drive the real UI (live preview, no mocks), adapt each item to this app's actual screens/flows, and check every box off one by one. A box you can't check is an integration bug to fix — not a skip:

  • Clicking the app's "Sign in with {provider}" button (Google, GitHub, …) redirects to the provider's authorize URL carrying the correct client_id, the app's requested scopes, AND the app's registered redirect_uri — inspect the actual outbound URL (the 302 Location, or the address the popup/tab navigates to) and confirm each value; a missing or wrong one is the bug.
  • The callback route exchanges the returned code SERVER-SIDE for a token, fetches the profile, and creates-or-links the app user + establishes a session — after the round-trip the app shows that user logged in. CAVEAT: the provider's own consent screen runs on ITS domain and CANNOT be driven in the sandbox, so verify the two boundaries you DO own — the authorize URL going out (above) and the callback coming back — not the provider's page. Complete the round-trip with a test/stub provider bond if one is wired; otherwise assert the callback handler's own behavior (state check → code exchange → user create-or-link → session). Never mock the flow or edit production code to bypass the provider.
  • A returning OAuth user logs into the SAME account — sign in twice and confirm one user row linked by provider id (oauthServer + oauthId), not a fresh duplicate created each time.
  • SECURITY — the state parameter is generated on initiation and verified on callback (CSRF protection): a mismatched or absent state is rejected (403); the redirect_uri is validated against an allowlist so an attacker cannot redirect the code elsewhere; and the client secret + tokens stay server-side — grep the browser bundle and network tab to confirm the secret never reaches the client (only the authorize URL and returned code cross the boundary).