@molecule/api-kyc

Auto-generated, AI-first package reference for the molecule.dev ecosystem. It is written to be read by coding agents as much as by people, and is generated from this package's source — edit src/index.ts JSDoc, not this file.

KYC / identity verification core interface for molecule.dev (server-side).

Defines a stack-neutral contract for KYC bonds (Stripe Identity, Persona, Onfido, Sumsub, etc.). Bond a provider at startup, then call the convenience wrappers from anywhere.

Quick Start

import { setProvider, createVerificationSession } from '@molecule/api-kyc'
import { provider } from '@molecule/api-kyc-stripe-identity'

setProvider(provider)

const session = await createVerificationSession({
  userId: 'user-123',
  type: 'document',
  returnUrl: 'https://app.example.com/verify/done',
})

// Redirect the end user to session.url ...

Type

core

Installation

npm install @molecule/api-kyc @molecule/api-bond @molecule/api-i18n

API

Interfaces

CreateKycSessionOptions

Caller-supplied parameters when creating a verification session.

interface CreateKycSessionOptions {
  /**
   * Caller's stable identifier for the end user. Stored as provider metadata
   * so webhook events and status lookups can be correlated.
   */
  userId: string
  /** Type of identity check to request. */
  type: KycVerificationType
  /**
   * URL to send the user to after they complete or abandon the
   * provider-hosted flow. Some providers also expose a hosted URL — see
   * {@link KycSession.url}.
   */
  returnUrl?: string
  /**
   * Free-form key/value pairs forwarded to the provider as session metadata.
   * Useful for correlating with caller-side records (case id, app id, etc.).
   * Values are coerced to strings by the provider.
   */
  metadata?: Record<string, string>
}

KycProvider

KYC provider contract.

Each method is stack-neutral; bonds for different providers (Stripe Identity, Persona, Onfido, Sumsub) expose the same shape. Providers throw on errors with sanitized messages — never leaking API keys, webhook secrets, or verbatim provider error bodies that may echo credentials.

interface KycProvider {
  /**
   * Creates a new verification session at the provider.
   *
   * @param options - Session parameters (user, type, return URL, metadata).
   * @returns The created session, including a hosted URL where applicable.
   */
  createVerificationSession(options: CreateKycSessionOptions): Promise<KycSession>

  /**
   * Fetches the current status of a verification session.
   *
   * @param sessionId - Provider-specific session id from
   *   {@link KycSession.sessionId}.
   * @returns The normalized session status.
   */
  getVerificationStatus(sessionId: string): Promise<KycSessionStatus>

  /**
   * Cancels a verification session. Idempotent — canceling an already-canceled
   * session SHOULD return the same status without throwing.
   *
   * @param sessionId - Provider-specific session id from
   *   {@link KycSession.sessionId}.
   * @returns The session status after cancellation.
   */
  cancelVerificationSession(sessionId: string): Promise<KycSessionStatus>

  /**
   * Verifies the signature of an inbound webhook and returns the normalized
   * event. Throws if the signature is invalid or the payload cannot be parsed.
   *
   * @param headers - Inbound request headers (verbatim — bonds extract the
   *   right signature header).
   * @param body - Raw request body bytes (do NOT pass a parsed JSON object —
   *   most providers sign the exact byte sequence).
   * @returns The normalized webhook event.
   */
  processWebhook(headers: KycWebhookHeaders, body: string | Buffer): Promise<KycWebhookEvent>
}

KycSession

A verification session created with a KYC provider.

Sessions are the unit of state — once created they progress through statuses ({@link KycStatus}) until terminal (verified or canceled).

interface KycSession {
  /** Provider-specific session identifier. Opaque to callers. */
  sessionId: string
  /**
   * Provider-hosted URL to redirect the user to. Some providers (e.g. those
   * using a client-side SDK with a single-use token) MAY return `null` —
   * callers must then use the SDK directly.
   */
  url: string | null
  /**
   * Optional epoch-millis expiry of the hosted session. After this time the
   * session URL stops working and the caller must create a new session.
   */
  expiresAt?: number
}

KycSessionStatus

Result of {@link KycProvider.getVerificationStatus}.

interface KycSessionStatus {
  /** Provider-specific session identifier. */
  sessionId: string
  /** Normalized status across providers. */
  status: KycStatus
  /**
   * Verification type at create time. Useful for callers that do not store
   * the type alongside the session id.
   */
  type?: KycVerificationType
  /**
   * Provider-specific reason code when status is `requires_input` or
   * `canceled`. Opaque string — meant for logging / display, not branching.
   */
  lastErrorCode?: string
  /** Provider-specific human-readable error reason. */
  lastErrorReason?: string
}

KycWebhookEvent

A normalized webhook event. Returned by {@link KycProvider.processWebhook} after the signature has been verified.

interface KycWebhookEvent {
  /** The normalized event type. */
  type: KycWebhookEventType
  /** Provider-specific session identifier the event applies to. */
  sessionId: string
  /** Caller-supplied user id stored in session metadata. */
  userId?: string
  /** Verification type at create time. */
  verificationType?: KycVerificationType
  /** Caller-supplied metadata stored on the session. */
  metadata?: Record<string, string>
  /** Provider-specific reason code for failure events. */
  lastErrorCode?: string
  /** Provider-specific human-readable failure reason. */
  lastErrorReason?: string
  /** Raw provider event object — kept for round-tripping / debugging. */
  raw?: Record<string, unknown>
}

Types

KycStatus

Normalized verification status, common across all KYC bonds.

• pending — the session has been created but the user has not started.
• requires_input — provider has rejected or paused; the user must take another action (resubmit document, retry selfie, etc.).
• processing — provider is currently reviewing submitted material.
• verified — verification succeeded.
• canceled — the session was canceled (by caller, user, or provider).

type KycStatus = 'pending' | 'requires_input' | 'processing' | 'verified' | 'canceled'

KycVerificationType

Type of identity check requested for a verification session.

• document — government-issued photo ID + selfie liveness check.
• id_number — verifies a government-issued number (e.g. SSN) without a document.
• address — verifies the user's residential address.

Provider support varies; bonds MAY throw when asked for a type they do not support.

type KycVerificationType = 'document' | 'id_number' | 'address'

KycWebhookEventType

Discriminated event type emitted by {@link KycProvider.processWebhook}.

Bonds normalize provider-specific event names into one of these three variants. Provider-specific raw payload is preserved in {@link KycWebhookEvent.raw} so callers needing extra detail can opt in.

type KycWebhookEventType =
  'verification.verified' | 'verification.requires_input' | 'verification.canceled'

KycWebhookHeaders

Headers required for {@link KycProvider.processWebhook}. Lower-cased keys.

Different providers use different header names for the signature; bonds are responsible for picking the right one(s) from this map. Callers should pass the request's headers verbatim.

type KycWebhookHeaders = Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>

Functions

cancelVerificationSession(sessionId)

Convenience wrapper that delegates to the bonded provider.

function cancelVerificationSession(sessionId: string): Promise<KycSessionStatus>

• sessionId — Provider-specific session id.

Returns: The session status after cancellation.

createVerificationSession(options)

Convenience wrapper that delegates to the bonded provider.

function createVerificationSession(options: CreateKycSessionOptions): Promise<KycSession>

• options — Session parameters (user, type, return URL, metadata).

Returns: The created session.

getOptionalProvider()

Retrieves the bonded KYC provider, returning null if none is bonded.

function getOptionalProvider(): KycProvider | null

Returns: The bonded KYC provider, or null.

getProvider()

Retrieves the bonded KYC provider, throwing if none is configured.

function getProvider(): KycProvider

Returns: The bonded KYC provider.

getVerificationStatus(sessionId)

Convenience wrapper that delegates to the bonded provider.

function getVerificationStatus(sessionId: string): Promise<KycSessionStatus>

• sessionId — Provider-specific session id.

Returns: The normalized session status.

hasProvider()

Checks whether a KYC provider is currently bonded.

function hasProvider(): boolean

Returns: true if a KYC provider is bonded.

processWebhook(headers, body)

Convenience wrapper that delegates to the bonded provider.

function processWebhook(
  headers: KycWebhookHeaders,
  body: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>,
): Promise<KycWebhookEvent>

• headers — Inbound request headers (verbatim).
• body — Raw request body bytes.

Returns: The normalized webhook event.

setProvider(provider)

Registers a KYC provider as the active singleton. Called by bond packages (e.g. @molecule/api-kyc-stripe-identity) during app startup.

function setProvider(provider: KycProvider): void

• provider — The KYC provider implementation to bond.

Available Providers

Provider	Package
Stripe Identity	@molecule/api-kyc-stripe-identity

Injection Notes

Requirements

Peer dependencies:

• @molecule/api-bond ^1.0.1
• @molecule/api-i18n ^1.0.1

Runtime Dependencies

• @molecule/api-bond

• @molecule/api-i18n

• Verification state comes ONLY from the server-side provider — never from the browser. The user landing back on returnUrl proves nothing (anyone can navigate there), and a client-sent "verified" flag proves less. Update your stored KYC state from {@link processWebhook} events (or a server-side {@link getVerificationStatus} check) and gate features on YOUR stored state.

• processWebhook needs the RAW request body (string/Buffer exactly as received) — providers sign the exact byte sequence, so a JSON-parsed and re-serialized body fails signature verification. Mount the webhook route with a raw-body reader, pass the headers verbatim, return 4xx when it throws (bad signature) and 2xx only after processing succeeds.

• Redirect the user to session.url (the provider-hosted flow) — never build your own document-capture UI. url MAY be null for SDK-based providers, and hosted sessions expire (expiresAt) — create a fresh session rather than reusing an old one. Persist session.sessionId keyed to the user so webhook events correlate.

• Statuses are non-linear: handle requires_input (start a NEW session) and canceled, not just verified. Provider API keys / webhook secrets are bond-specific env vars (see the bond's docs) and stay SERVER-SIDE.

E2E Tests

Integration checklist — drive the real UI (live preview, no mocks), adapt each item to this app's actual screens/flows, and check every box off one by one. A box you can't check is an integration bug to fix — not a skip:

• Starting a verification from the UI creates a real session: createVerificationSession is called, the app persists the returned KycSession.sessionId on the user's record with stored status pending, and the user is handed to the provider-hosted session.url — NOT a home-grown document-capture screen, and NOT marked verified at creation.
• COUNTERPARTY (the identity check runs out-of-band on the external vendor and can't be completed for real in-sandbox): verify the decision against the app's OWN stored KYC state — deliver a verification.verified (or verification.requires_input / verification.canceled) event to the webhook endpoint, or poll getVerificationStatus, and confirm the user's stored status flips pending → verified / requires_input / canceled and the UI shows it. Observe the transition, never guess it.
• KYC-gated features are enforced SERVER-SIDE: while the stored status is not verified, the restricted action is REJECTED by the server (not merely a hidden button); once verified, the same user is allowed. Flipping the stored status changes access after a full reload.
• processWebhook rejects a forged decision — a bad/missing signature THROWS and becomes a 4xx with NO state change (the user stays unverified); only a signature-verified event may flip stored status.
• A user CANNOT self-verify: no endpoint accepts a client-sent "verified" flag or lets a caller PATCH their own status, and landing back on returnUrl alone changes nothing — the only path to verified is a signature-verified webhook or a server-side getVerificationStatus check.
• SECURITY / PRIVACY — identity documents and PII stay server-side: the user is redirected to the provider-hosted flow (the app never receives or stores raw ID images), one user can't read another's session/status/PII by guessing its id, and neither the documents nor the webhook secret are logged in the clear.